In the article ‘Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno’, Knapton & Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’ which further augmented during the incident.
Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment. There were no updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated. Sprinklers were required to install up to 30 metres which made taller buildings to omit on the upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.
The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the government in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the government did play an extensive role in the fire. One example would be minimal, or no action was taken from previously raised concerns about fire regulations from salient incidents, before this catastrophe.
Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment. There were no updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated. Sprinklers were required to install up to 30 metres which made taller buildings to omit on the upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.
The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the government in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the government did play an extensive role in the fire. One example would be minimal, or no action was taken from previously raised concerns about fire regulations from salient incidents, before this catastrophe.
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