In the article ‘Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno’, Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’ which further augmented during the incident.
Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment. There were no updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated. Sprinklers were required to install up to 30 metres which made taller buildings to omit on the upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.
The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the government in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the government did play an extensive role in the fire. One example would be minimal, or no action was taken from previously raised concerns about fire regulations from salient incidents, before this catastrophe.
Initially, the fire could have been contained locally in the kitchen. In irony, the UK approved cladding spread the fire from the source to the back of cladding which rose up to the roof and eventually enclosed the building. The cladding material only required to satisfy the requirement of not spreading the flames over the surface. It did not matter of its properties at the back. Both the gap and the combustible material at the back of the cladding was the catalyst for the spread of the fire. According to investigators, the back of the cladding made of aluminium composite tiles was flammable. Hypotheses if the cladding were of non-combustible material, the fire would not pulsate out to the cladding. The firefighters would have supposedly ended the fire within the section of origin.
Next, so much could have been done to save the lives lost in the catastrophe, even though the cladding is the primary reason for the ‘Inferno’. The synthesis from the insufficient sprinklers to the only escape route and failed fire breakers it all boils to the lack of proper building regulation and safety rules. According to Hackitt, in her final safety report to the parliament was to have a complete review of the building regulations. If the building regulation has been reviewed after the fire in Lakanal House, which took six lives, as seriously as the Grenfell Tower these lapses would have been spotted out earlier and consequent buildings could have been saved from imperilment. Lapses such as the ‘stay put’ policy which was equivocal, theoretical it seems valid but in reality, the environment usually being dynamic would be preferable to find a way to evacuate to be feasible. In the case of the Grenfell Tower, it would have at least saved the lives and leaving the building solitary to the 'inferno'.
Thus, it is evident that the government lack of proactiveness and procrastination to update the superseded building and safety regulation was the reason for the whole ordeal. The government did not need a massive catastrophe to give it a rude awaking on their roles and responsibilities.
Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/post-grenfell-review-finds-uk-s-building-regulations-system-broken-10243260
https://doi.org/10.1080/20450249.2017.1368260
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