In the article ‘Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno’, Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’ which further augmented during the incident.
Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of the material being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Knapton and Dixon (2017) highlighted that although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment nor updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated. Knapton and Dixon (2017) remarked that sprinklers were only required to install up to 30 metres which left taller buildings to omit on its upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.
The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the authorities in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the authorities did play an extensive role in the fire. However, I believe there were only two main reasons for the fire instead of eight — namely, no appropriate building regulation and inadequate fire and safety directive.
According to the UK Building Regulations (2010), a building regulation sets a national standard for buildings to protect people with a provision of safety. In irony, the fire spread from the source to the back of the' UK approved' cladding which rose up to the roof and eventually enclosed the building. Sadly the cladding material only required to satisfy the requirement of not spreading the flames over the surface. It did not matter of its properties at the back. Knapton and Dixon (2017) distinguished that both the gap and the combustible material at the back of the cladding was the catalyst for the spread of the fire. According to Doward (2018), investigators itemised the back of the cladding made of aluminium composite tiles was flammable. Hypotheses if the cladding were of non-combustible material, the fire would not pulsate out to the cladding. The firefighters would have supposedly ended the fire within the section of origin.
Concurring to London Fire Brigade (n.d.), fire safety regulations are of paramount as they are 'designed to save lives and protect both people and property'. In contradiction, so much should have been done to save the lives lost in the catastrophe, even though the cladding is the primary reason for the ‘inferno’. The synthesis from the insufficient sprinklers to the only escape route and failed fire breakers it all boils to the lack of proper fire and safety rules. According to Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, (2018), in the final safety report to the parliament was to have a complete review of both the building regulations and fire and safety laws. The Times (2017) expressed that if the building regulation had been reviewed and published after the fire in Lakanal House, which took six lives, as seriously as the Grenfell Tower these lapses would have been spotted out earlier and consequent buildings could have been saved from imperilment. Lapses such as the ‘stay put’ policy which was equivocal. Theoretical it might seem valid but in reality, the environment usually being dynamic would be preferably best to find a way to evacuate. In the case of the Grenfell Tower, it would have at least saved the lives and leaving the building solitary to the 'inferno'.
Thus, it is evident that the lack of proactiveness and procrastination to update the superseded building and fire and safety regulation was the reason for the whole ordeal. The authorities did not need a massive catastrophe to give them a rude awaking on their roles and responsibilities.
References
Post-grenfell Review Finds Uk's Building Regulations System Broken
Fire Advice Is To Flee As Tests Show Grenfell-style Cladding Unsafe
Jamie Doward
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/19/grenfell-tower-fire-tests-cladding-unsafe-fire-brigade-advice-to-flee
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/19/grenfell-tower-fire-tests-cladding-unsafe-fire-brigade-advice-to-flee
Grenfell Tower: 'catastrophic' Safety Failures Outlined
Not what anyone wanted: Observations on regulations, standards, quality and experience in the wake of Grenfell
Christopher Gorse & John Sturges
May Orders National Inquiry After 100% Failure Rate in High-rise Cladding Tests
Peter Walker-Robert Booth
Grenfell Tower Fire: Ministers Face Questions Over Safety Review
Billy Kenber- Dominic Kennedy
Building Control
Planning Portal
https://www.planningportal.co.uk/info/200128/building_control
Building a Safer Future Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report
Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf
Governance - London Fire Commissioner
https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/about-us/governance-london-fire-commissioner/
Building a Safer Future Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report
Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf
Governance - London Fire Commissioner
https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/about-us/governance-london-fire-commissioner/
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