Summary_Reader Response Draft#3

In the article ‘Eight Failures that Left People of Grenfell Tower at Mercy of the Inferno’, Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’, which further augmented during the incident.

Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 whereby external walls had to have at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of the material was combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Knapton and Dixon (2017) highlighted that although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spreading and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment nor updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. Knapton and Dixon (2017)  reported that, according to sources, not all doors were fire-rated.  In addition sprinklers were only required to be installed up to 30 metres, which left taller buildings omitting them on their upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks, which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991, were not serving their purpose during the fire.

The authors described the events and different perspective of the fire. They pointed out about the ambiguity of the authorities in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the authorities did play an extensive role in failing to control the fire. However, I believe there were only two reasons instead of eight: namely, no appropriate building regulation and inadequate fire and safety directive.

Firstly, appropriate building regulation was required. According to the UK Building Regulations (2010), a building regulation sets a national standard for buildings to protect people. Ironically, in the Grenfell Tower, the fire spread from the source to the back of the' UK approved' cladding, which rose up to the roof and eventually enclosed the building. Sadly the cladding material only required to satisfy of not spreading the flames over the surface. Knapton and Dixon (2017) mentioned that both the gap and the combustible material at the back of the cladding was the catalyst for the spread of the fire. According to Doward (2018), investigators determined the back of the cladding made of aluminium composite tiles was flammable. It was suggested that, if the cladding were of non-combustible material, the fire would not have pulsated back to the cladding. The firefighters would have supposedly ended the fire within the section of origin.

Secondly, an adequate fire and safety directive was needed. According to the London Fire Brigade (n.d.), fire safety regulations are paramount as they are 'designed to save lives and protect both people and property'. In contradiction, lives lost in the catastrophe could be saved hypothetically, even though the cladding was the primary reason for the ‘inferno’.  Included in the fire safety regulation, the combination of from the insufficient sprinklers to the only escape route and failed fire breakers it all boils to the lack of proper fire and safety rules. Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, (2018), report to the parliament, recommended a complete review of both the building regulations and fire safety laws. Kenber and Kennedy (2017) expressed that, if the building regulation had been reviewed and published after the fire in Lakanal House, which took six lives, as seriously as the Grenfell Tower these lapses would have been spotted out earlier and consequent buildings could have been saved from imperilment. In the case of the Grenfell Tower, it would have at least saved the lives and left the building to the 'inferno'. 

Thus, it is evident that the lack of a proactive approach and procrastination to update the superseded building and fire and safety regulation was the catalyst for the whole ordeal. The authorities did not need a massive catastrophe to give them a rude awaking on their roles and responsibilities.

References

Building Control. (2010). Planning Portal. Retrieved from

https://www.planningportal.co.uk/info/200128/building_control

Dixon, H., & Knapton, S. (2017, June 16). Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower

at mercy of the inferno. The Telegraph. Retrieved from

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/15/eight-failures-left-people-grenfell-tower-mercy-inferno/

Doward, J. (2018). Fire Advice Is To Flee As Tests Show Grenfell-style Cladding Unsafe.

The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/19/grenfell-tower-fire-tests-cladding-unsafe-fire-brigade-advice-to-flee

Fire Governance. (n.d.). London Fire Brigade. Retrieved from

https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/about-us/governance-london-fire-commissioner/

Kenber, B., & Kennedy, D. (2017). Grenfell Tower Fire: Ministers Face Questions Over  

Safety Review. The Times. Retrieved from

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/grenfell-tower-fire-may-s-aide-gavin-barwell-sat-on-safety-review-x0t763kv0

Ministry( Secretary of State)of Housing, Communities & Local Government. (2018).

Building a Safer Future Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report. Gov UK. Retrieved from
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf

Blog post updated on 31 March 2019