Tuesday, 12 March 2019

Technical Report Draft #1B

Introduction
This project has been developed in response to the request for proposal on developing solution of an environmental problem.

As the weather gets warmer due to global warming, Singaporeans tend to rely on cooling appliances for their own purposes. This contributes to higher air-conditioning demands, which give rise to the increase in greenhouse gaseous emissions. As a result, a vicious cycle is formed which would further aggravate the issue should there be no actions taken.

The rise in urbanisation along with variations in the man-made global warming effects lead to the increase of the temperature. According to Meteorological Service Singapore (MSS) (n.d.), “Eight of the ten warmest years on record in Singapore have occurred in the 21st century and all the ten warmest years are since 1997.”  The surface air temperature has increased at an average of 0.25°C per decade between 1948 and 2017. The graph of the annual surface temperature is shown in Appendix 1.

From the graph, it is clear that the rising of temperature is an issue of concern and is in dire needs of a solution to address the UHI effect in Singapore. The UHI effect will continue to exacerbate the frequency of heat waves. Residents from the vulnerable age groups such as children, elderly, and those with existing medical conditions, are at a particular risk.

Apart from affecting the residents, the rising of temperatures also concerned the authorities in which the government is currently diverting its attention to. According to Parliament Singapore (2019), the Environment and Water Resources Minister Masagos Zulkifli addressed the need for mitigating the UHI effect in Singapore. One of his suggested measures was to integrate open spaces with greenery “to cool our island” through “shade and evapotranspiration.”

With the aim to incorporate greenery in open spaces and reduce surface temperature with evapotranspiration, green roofing would be a viable element. Green roofing is a method of planting vegetation on the roof of a building. The plants of the green roof are able to absorb carbon dioxide, one of the most abundant greenhouse gases, through the process of photosynthesis. As the plants reduce carbon dioxide from the environment, it produces fresh air and improves the quality of air. In addition, as plant experiences transpiration, it releases evaporated water which cools its surrounding environment. This brings down the need for air-conditioning. The previous sentence could be supported by Norquist (2012) that “a green roof would help reduce the air-conditioning demand.” Apart from providing a cooling effect and releasing fresh air, green roofs helps to reflect solar radiation which further reduces the UHI effect.


The pie chart in Appendix 2 represents the number of HDB car-parks that exists in Singapore. Out of the total of 2108 car-parks, 2% of it is represented by “others” which includes basement, covered, and mechanised carpark. Most of the car-parks in Singapore are the surface car-parks (51%) and multi-storey car-parks (47%). Since multi-storey car-parks occupies almost half of the total amount of car-parks in singapore, with the fact that most of the rooftops are usually under-utilised, the implementation of retrofitting green roofs on the vacant spaces would create a considerable impact in reducing the UHI effect.

From the team’s observation, it is noticeable that most rooftop of HDB multi-storey car-parks are empty. This could be supported by Figure 1, which depicts two adjacent MSCP. Retrofitting green roof on the under-utilised space, not only would maximise the space utilisation on the rooftop, more importantly it would be able to reduce the effects of UHI in the estate. The green roofs would also enhance the aesthetical value of the estate and cool the environment with the method of evapotranspiration.

Figure 1. Rooftop of a HDB MSCP to photo taken by Syahiran
Problem Statement

Green roofs should be installed at every open rooftop of HDB multi-storey car park to reduce the temperature around the surrounding vicinity and add aesthetic value too. However, there are still a lot of under-utilised multi-storey car parks, especially at the rooftop. Not only does the roof garden at existing multi-storey car parks help to tackle the UHI effect, it also mitigates the issue of land scarcity. This would create a conducive environment for residents in the estate.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this report is to propose to the estate management department of Housing Development Board (HDB) to adopt green roof at existing under-utilised multi-storey car parks at the older estate. The implementation of this idea will help to mitigate the UHI effect and further beautify the estate.


Proposed Solution

The team’s proposed solution to mitigate the UHI effect in Singapore is to retrofit green roof at under-utilised top storey of HDB multi-storey car park. Green roof relies mainly on sunlight and water to reduce the surrounding temperature by evapotranspiration and increases the aesthetical value of the estates. There are two types of green roofs that our team would like to propose, namely the extensive and intensive green roof system.

The selection of the different types of green roof to be retrofitted depends on the structural integrity and the budget allocation of each car park.In an interview with Nurul Sharfirin, a former Higher Estate Executive of HDB, different estates or region will have different budget depending on its size and maintenance. Most of the time the Town Council (TC) will be maintaining the MSCPs and not HDB. HDB, TC, and governance, risk management and compliance (GRC) would probably have a joint meeting to discuss on the issues or concerns that may arise from the project.

Extensive Green Roof

Extensive green roof is the lightest type of green roof. It normally weighs between 74 to 122 kg/m2. This greatly reduces the amount of structural change that is required for the car park. The weight of the soil is in proportion to its growing medium depth which ranges from 3 to 5 inches deep.

Drought-resistant plants such as coneflower, lavender and grasses are some of the plants used due to them having shallow root system which requires minimal water. The variety of plants are kept to a minimum to ensure that every plant has similar moisture absorption content. They also require limited fertilisers. During extreme dry season, this design may turn brown if there is not enough irrigation. This design is the easiest to install and limits the access as minimal maintenance is required.

Intensive Green Roof

An intensive green roof can be installed at a better structural integrity of a building as it is much heavier compared to extensive green roof. The soil has a depth of 6 inches deep or more and weighs roughly around 100 kg/m2 when it is dry and 150 kg/m2 when fully soaked. In order to install this design, the weight factor needs to be considered thoroughly as it is dependent on the current strength of the car-park. One of the crucial factor is to consider the irrigation and drainage system as they may overload the roof’s structure.
With a deeper soil medium, this system allows the plantation of the different types of trees or plants of shape and sizes. Normally, the roof will include benches, walkways and shelters for the public to rest or even interact with the natural features.
However, this design requires more maintenance due to the variety of plants. This will lead to an increase of pests and weeds. In addition to that, fertilizers, and amount of water or irrigation needed plays a huge part in maintaining this design. It typically stays more appealing during the dry weather.
Benefits of Proposed Solution
There are many benefits of the proposed solution such as reducing surface temperature, improving surrounding air quality, reducing surrounding noise, managing stormwater, ecological benefits and social benefits.
  • Reducing surface temperature

The green roof reduces the surface temperature at the estate, provides thermal comfort to the residents and absorbs fewer solar radiations acting as a buffer in between the sun’s radiation and the concrete surface of multi-storey carpark rooftop.
  • Improving surrounding air quality

The green roof captures harmful fine dust particles from the air and improves the quality of the air.
  • Reducing surrounding noise

The green roof absorbs the sound waves and reduces the noise level significantly as compared to traditional rooftop caused by the vehicles in the carpark.
  • Improve stormwater management

The green roof holds the water for a period of time to reduce or delay the flow of water to the drainage system. It also helps evaporate the rainwater, by releasing it back into the atmosphere instead of drains and sewers.
  • Ecological benefits

The green roof enhances the aesthetic of the estate and reduces the sunlight glare as it does not reflect it.
  • Social benefits

The green roof provides relief from the concrete surface of the rooftop. The presence of green has a relaxing psychological effect on the residents. It also substantially enhance residential property value to the estate.
Proposal Evaluation

In this section, the challenges as well as the feasibility of the proposed solutions will be discussed.

The proposed solution of installing extensive and intensive green roofs to mitigate the UHI effect is achievable due to the strategic location of the MSCP which is surrounded by the tall HDB flats. The map of the MSCP is shown under Appendix _.


Concerns of having a Green Roof:

Even though this proposed solution could help to mitigate the UHI effect, there are a few concerns that need to be considered. These primary concerns includes structural limitations, cost, and maintenance.

As seen from the image _ from Appendix _, an average car-park can contain 74 numbers of cars per storey and the average weight of a car is estimated to be 2 tonnes.

Extensive green roof does not pose any weight problem since it is light. However, intensive green roof could alter the structural weight of the car-park due to some of its properties. The planting medium of this design ranges in between 6 to 18 inches deep and subsequently, the weight of the plant increases after a period of time. During the wet season, this design could potentially be fully soaked which further stresses the loading capacity of the car-park. Since the car-park rooftop has a flat surface, planting the green roof would not cause a problem.

Although green roof helps to reduce the energy cost in the surrounding, it is rather costly in installing and maintaining the green roof. The table below shows some of the factors that needs to be considered.

Installation of Green Roof
Maintenance of Green Roof
Purchasing of different types of soil and plants
Pesticide and herbicide
Purchasing of  planting materials such as moisture blanket
Repairing cost of leakages from water tank or sprinkler
Equipment
Replacing of dead plants
Irrigation and fertilizers
Inspection of condition of green roof and also stagnant water
Transportation
Hiring of green roof professionals

Maintaining the green roof is a time-consuming and tedious job as it ensures sufficient irrigation and fertilizers for the plants to grow well. In addition, daily inspection is required to check for any types of damages to the plants or leakages from the water tank or sprinklers. Pests and weeds will also affect the growth of the plant. If the green roof is not maintain regularly, it would result in an increase in plant losses and the cost of replacing it would be significantly high. Furthermore, the green roof may turn into an unhygienic place and untidy if the condition is not maintain properly.
Methodology and Procedure

Primary Research
The team conducted an interview with Associate Professor Dr Kum Yung Juan, to understand the challenges and limitations of retrofitting a green roof. In terms of engineering, it was concluded that there did not exist any restriction in retrofitting a green roof in the rooftop of a multi-storey car park.

At this juncture we were clear that in the aspect of retrofitting the green roof on existing multi-storey car park it was possible. We were not sure of the bureaucracy and procedure of HDB.  In order to understand how HDB works when involving estate management of buildings and amenities. They conducted an interview with Ms Nurul S, who was a former HDB and  gave us the inside on how HDB plans for an estate, for this case how HDB maintains existing older estates multi-storey car parks.

Secondary Research
The main source of our secondary research is from NParks (n.d.). This website provides information on skyrise gardening, planning, design and safety considerations, types of plants to consider, frequently asked questions and case studies of other projects that adopted the green roof concept. Additional sources include online publication, handbooks and websites which supported the contents in this  report are Bringing Greenery Skywards (2017), Guidelines on Planting of Trees, Palms and Tall Shrubs on Rooftop (2012), Frese, Z. (2016), Mithraratne, N. (2013) As for figures, they are sourced from Meteorological Service Singapore (n.d.).

Findings
The team surveyed 10 multi storey car parks at different estates during different periods of the day. Cars were seen parked on the rooftop of only 2 out of 10 multi-storey car parks. Of  which, less than 5 cars were seen on the 2 rooftops that contained cars. From there it was concluded the multi-storey car park is typically under-utilised. Retrofitting the rooftop of the multi-storey carpark with green roof would be a viable solution since nearly half of the HDB car parks consist of multi-storey car park, which could be seen from the chart in  Appendix B. This not only mitigates the UHI effect, it also does not cause further strain on the land scarce problem that Singapore is facing.


Conclusion
The UHI effect is a reciprocal effect of rising surface air temperature. The lack of natural landscape on buildings lead to an increase of the surface air temperature as heat get trapped in between buildings. Since urbanisation is projected to accelerate in the coming years, mitigation measures must be implemented to curb the UHI effect. With the presence of green roof on MSCP, it can significantly reduce the UHI effect in the estate. Not only does the proposed idea of retrofitting a green roof in HDB MSCP reduces noise, improves air quality, manages stormwater, provides ecological and social benefits, it also reduces the surface temperature through evapotranspiration which eventually reduces the UHI effect in the estate. This creates a beneficial meaning to both the community and environment.

Tuesday, 5 March 2019

Technical Report Draft#1

Introduction
This project has been developed in response to the request for proposal on developing solution of an environmental problem.

As Singapore temperature become hotter, its citizens rely on the cooling appliances for their own purposes. This further contributes to higher usage in electrical energy which contributes to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore this results in the rise in temperature which leads to a vicious cycle. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/cnainsider/singapore-hot-weather-urban-heat-effect-temperature-humidity-11115384.

Temperature statistics.
According to Meteorological Service Singapore (MSS) (n.d.), the surface air temperature has increased at an average of 0.25°C per decade between 1948 and 2017. The rise in urbanisation along with variations in the man-made global warming effects lead to the increase of the temperature. “Eight of the ten warmest years on record in Singapore have occurred in the 21st century and all the ten warmest years are since 1997.”




Environment and Water Resources Minister Masagos Zulkifli addressed the need for mitigating the urban heat island effect in Singapore. One of his suggested measures was to integrate open spaces with greenery “to cool our island” through “shade and evapotranspiration.”

                                   





Negative impacts urban heat could bring about
From the above mentioned, it is clearly stated that is an issue of concern and in dire needs of a solution to address the issue.



With the enhancement of green concept into the estates,


Problem Statement
Green roofs should be installed at every open rooftop of HDB multi-storey car park to reduce the temperature around the surrounding vicinity and add aesthetic value too.

However, there are a lot of under-utilised multi-storey car parks, especially at the rooftop.

The roof garden at existing multi-storey carpark not only helps to tackle the Urban heat island effects, it also does not contribute to the issues with land scarity. This would create a conducive environment for residents in the estate.

Purpose Statement


The purpose of this report is to propose to the Estate Management Department of Housing Development Board (HDB) to adopt Green Roof at existing underutilised Multi-storey Carpark (MSCP) at the older estate. The implementation of this idea will help to mitigate the urban heat island and further beautify the estate.

Tuesday, 19 February 2019

Blog post # 2 (annotated bibliography)

Bianchini, F., & Heage, K. (2012). Probabilistic social cost-benefit analysis for green roofs: A lifecycle approach. Building and Environment 58 (2012) 152-162. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2012.07.005.

This article explains the costs of installing and maintaining different types of green roofs and its long term and social benefits. A simple extensive roof which has no public access would cost significantly lesser than an intensive green roof which has public access. “Intensive roofs are associated with roof gardens; need a reasonable depth of soil and require constant maintenance. Extensive roofs have a relatively thin layer of soil, and are designed to be virtually self-sustaining, therefore require low maintenance.”. Although green roof cost significantly higher, it would offset the cost by saving on utility costs and rainwater management and has a longer lifespan compared with conventional roofing materials. The maintenance regime consists of ‘fertilisation, irrigation, weed control, and replanting when required’.

Bianchini and Heage (2012), claimed that researchers conducted a lifespan cost on green roofs, cool roofs and conventional roofs. They concluded that while green roofs are expensive, it does provide significantly higher relative benefits over a 50-year lifecycle in terms of energy cost savings, reducing emissions, reducing stormwater fees. Compared to conventional roofs and cool roofs, green roofs provide more significant benefits in the long run. This article is comprehensive for those wanting to explore the cost of green roofs on new buildings. However, for those who wish to retrofit green roof on existing structures, i.e. which are above thirty years, would it still be cost-effective is a question to ponder. As to reap the benefit of a green roof requires long term whereas older existing buildings could post an indefinite payback period.

Commented on Jordan, Alfian and Nurul on 31 March 2019.

Saturday, 16 February 2019

Summary_Reader Response Draft#3

In the article ‘Eight Failures that Left People of Grenfell Tower at Mercy of the Inferno’, Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’, which further augmented during the incident.

Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 whereby external walls had to have at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of the material was combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Knapton and Dixon (2017) highlighted that although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spreading and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment nor updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. Knapton and Dixon (2017)  reported that, according to sources, not all doors were fire-rated.  In addition sprinklers were only required to be installed up to 30 metres, which left taller buildings omitting them on their upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks, which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991, were not serving their purpose during the fire.

The authors described the events and different perspective of the fire. They pointed out about the ambiguity of the authorities in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the authorities did play an extensive role in failing to control the fire. However, I believe there were only two reasons instead of eight: namely, no appropriate building regulation and inadequate fire and safety directive.

Firstly, appropriate building regulation was required. According to the UK Building Regulations (2010)a building regulation sets a national standard for buildings to protect people. Ironically, in the Grenfell Tower, the fire spread from the source to the back of the' UK approved' cladding, which rose up to the roof and eventually enclosed the building. Sadly the cladding material only required to satisfy of not spreading the flames over the surface. Knapton and Dixon (2017) mentioned that both the gap and the combustible material at the back of the cladding was the catalyst for the spread of the fire. According to Doward (2018), investigators determined the back of the cladding made of aluminium composite tiles was flammable. It was suggested that, if the cladding were of non-combustible material, the fire would not have pulsated back to the cladding. The firefighters would have supposedly ended the fire within the section of origin.

Secondly, an adequate fire and safety directive was needed. According to the London Fire Brigade (n.d.), fire safety regulations are paramount as they are 'designed to save lives and protect both people and property'. In contradiction, lives lost in the catastrophe could be saved hypothetically, even though the cladding was the primary reason for the ‘inferno’.  Included in the fire safety regulation, the combination of from the insufficient sprinklers to the only escape route and failed fire breakers it all boils to the lack of proper fire and safety rules. Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, (2018), report to the parliament, recommended a complete review of both the building regulations and fire safety laws. Kenber and Kennedy (2017) expressed that, if the building regulation had been reviewed and published after the fire in Lakanal House, which took six lives, as seriously as the Grenfell Tower these lapses would have been spotted out earlier and consequent buildings could have been saved from imperilment. In the case of the Grenfell Tower, it would have at least saved the lives and left the building to the 'inferno'. 

Thus, it is evident that the lack of a proactive approach and procrastination to update the superseded building and fire and safety regulation was the catalyst for the whole ordeal. The authorities did not need a massive catastrophe to give them a rude awaking on their roles and responsibilities.


References
Building Control. (2010). Planning Portal. Retrieved from
Dixon, H., & Knapton, S. (2017, June 16). Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower
at mercy of the inferno. The Telegraph. Retrieved from
Doward, J. (2018). Fire Advice Is To Flee As Tests Show Grenfell-style Cladding Unsafe.
Fire Governance. (n.d.). London Fire Brigade. Retrieved from
Kenber, B., & Kennedy, D. (2017). Grenfell Tower Fire: Ministers Face Questions Over  
Safety Review. The Times. Retrieved from

Ministry( Secretary of State)of Housing, Communities & Local Government. (2018).
Building a Safer Future Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report. Gov UK. Retrieved from
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf


Blog post updated on 31 March 2019

Sunday, 10 February 2019

Summary_reader response Draft #2

In the article ‘Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno’, Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’ which further augmented during the incident.

Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of the material being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Knapton and Dixon (2017) highlighted that although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment nor updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated.  Knapton and Dixon (2017) remarked that sprinklers were only required to install up to 30 metres which left taller buildings to omit on its upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.

The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the authorities in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the authorities did play an extensive role in the fire. However, I believe there were only two main reasons for the fire instead of eight — namely, no appropriate building regulation and inadequate fire and safety directive.

According to the UK Building Regulations (2010), a building regulation sets a national standard for buildings to protect people with a provision of safety. In irony, the fire spread from the source to the back of the' UK approved' cladding which rose up to the roof and eventually enclosed the building. Sadly the cladding material only required to satisfy the requirement of not spreading the flames over the surface. It did not matter of its properties at the back. Knapton and Dixon (2017) distinguished that both the gap and the combustible material at the back of the cladding was the catalyst for the spread of the fire. According to Doward (2018), investigators itemised the back of the cladding made of aluminium composite tiles was flammable. Hypotheses if the cladding were of non-combustible material, the fire would not pulsate out to the cladding. The firefighters would have supposedly ended the fire within the section of origin.

Concurring to London Fire Brigade (n.d.), fire safety regulations are of paramount as they are 'designed to save lives and protect both people and property'. In contradiction, so much should have been done to save the lives lost in the catastrophe, even though the cladding is the primary reason for the ‘inferno’.  The synthesis from the insufficient sprinklers to the only escape route and failed fire breakers it all boils to the lack of proper fire and safety rules. According to Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, (2018), in the final safety report to the parliament was to have a complete review of both the building regulations and fire and safety laws. The Times (2017) expressed that if the building regulation had been reviewed and published after the fire in Lakanal House, which took six lives, as seriously as the Grenfell Tower these lapses would have been spotted out earlier and consequent buildings could have been saved from imperilment. Lapses such as the ‘stay put’ policy which was equivocal. Theoretical it might seem valid but in reality, the environment usually being dynamic would be preferably best to find a way to evacuate. In the case of the Grenfell Tower, it would have at least saved the lives and leaving the building solitary to the 'inferno'. 

Thus, it is evident that the lack of proactiveness and procrastination to update the superseded building and fire and safety regulation was the reason for the whole ordeal. The authorities did not need a massive catastrophe to give them a rude awaking on their roles and responsibilities.





References

Post-grenfell Review Finds Uk's Building Regulations System Broken

Fire Advice Is To Flee As Tests Show Grenfell-style Cladding Unsafe
Jamie Doward
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/19/grenfell-tower-fire-tests-cladding-unsafe-fire-brigade-advice-to-flee

Grenfell Tower: 'catastrophic' Safety Failures Outlined

Not what anyone wanted: Observations on regulations, standards, quality and experience in the wake of Grenfell
Christopher Gorse & John Sturges

May Orders National Inquiry After 100% Failure Rate in High-rise Cladding Tests
Peter Walker-Robert Booth

Grenfell Tower Fire: Ministers Face Questions Over Safety Review
Billy Kenber- Dominic Kennedy

Building Control
Planning Portal
https://www.planningportal.co.uk/info/200128/building_control

Building a Safer Future Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report
Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/707785/Building_a_Safer_Future_-_web.pdf

Governance - London Fire Commissioner
https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/about-us/governance-london-fire-commissioner/



Tuesday, 5 February 2019

Summary_reader response Draft #1

In the article ‘Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno’, Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’ which further augmented during the incident.

Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment. There were no updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated. Sprinklers were required to install up to 30 metres which made taller buildings to omit on the upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.

The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the government in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the government did play an extensive role in the fire. One example would be minimal, or no action was taken from previously raised concerns about fire regulations from salient incidents, before this catastrophe.

Initially, the fire could have been contained locally in the kitchen. In irony, the UK approved cladding spread the fire from the source to the back of cladding which rose up to the roof and eventually enclosed the building. The cladding material only required to satisfy the requirement of not spreading the flames over the surface. It did not matter of its properties at the back. Both the gap and the combustible material at the back of the cladding was the catalyst for the spread of the fire. According to investigators, the back of the cladding made of aluminium composite tiles was flammable. Hypotheses if the cladding were of non-combustible material, the fire would not pulsate out to the cladding. The firefighters would have supposedly ended the fire within the section of origin.

Next, so much could have been done to save the lives lost in the catastrophe, even though the cladding is the primary reason for the ‘Inferno’.  The synthesis from the insufficient sprinklers to the only escape route and failed fire breakers it all boils to the lack of proper building regulation and safety rules. According to  Hackitt, in her final safety report to the parliament was to have a complete review of the building regulations. If the building regulation has been reviewed after the fire in Lakanal House, which took six lives, as seriously as the Grenfell Tower these lapses would have been spotted out earlier and consequent buildings could have been saved from imperilment. Lapses such as the ‘stay put’ policy which was equivocal, theoretical it seems valid but in reality, the environment usually being dynamic would be preferable to find a way to evacuate to be feasible. In the case of the Grenfell Tower, it would have at least saved the lives and leaving the building solitary to the 'inferno'.

Thus, it is evident that the government lack of proactiveness and procrastination to update the superseded building and safety regulation was the reason for the whole ordeal. The government did not need a massive catastrophe to give it a rude awaking on their roles and responsibilities.


Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/post-grenfell-review-finds-uk-s-building-regulations-system-broken-10243260




https://doi.org/10.1080/20450249.2017.1368260

Friday, 1 February 2019

Summary_thesis statement Draft#1

In the article ‘Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno’, Knapton & Dixon (2017) claimed that the Grenfell Tower had numerous lapses in both ‘building regulation and safety rules’ which further augmented during the incident.

Buildings in London followed the Building Acts until 1986 where external walls had at least one hour of fire resistance. ‘Class O’ regulation was introduced which removed the initial requirements regardless of being combustible. A specialist in fire protection remarked the gap between the claddings exacerbated the fire to upper levels. Although the materials used for the cladding met the UK standards, it contributed the fire to spread and made fire-fighting impractical. There was no explicit instruction on the fire risk assessment. There were no updated building regulations and it was not mandatory to have more than one escape route. According to sources, not all doors were fire-rated. Sprinklers were required to install up to 30 metres which made taller buildings to omit on the upper levels. Experts shared that the firebreaks which were a requirement under Building Regulations 1991 were not doing its purpose during the fire.

The article described the events and its observation of the fire. It pointed out about the ambiguity of the government in the relevant building regulations, fire and safety rules. In my opinion, the government did play an extensive role in the fire. One example would be minimal, or no action was taken from previously raised concerns about fire regulations from salient incidents, before this catastrophe.